



BENN'S SIXPENNY
LIBRARY, No. 71

★

THE
INQUISITION

By G. G. COULTON

LONDON: ERNEST BENN LIMITED

BENN'S SIXPENNY LIBRARY

No. COMPLETE LIST OF TITLES ALREADY PUBLISHED

1. A HISTORY OF ENGLAND by D. C. Somervell.
2. WORLD OF GREECE AND ROME by Edwyn Bevan.
3. EASTERN ART AND LITERATURE by Sir E. Denison Ross.
4. ROMAN BRITAIN by Gordon Home.
5. THE ORIGINS OF CIVILIZATION by E. N. Fallaize.
6. THE ORIGINS OF AGRICULTURE by Harold Peake.
7. NUTRITION AND DIETETICS by Professor E. P. Cathcart.
8. A HISTORY OF EUROPE, 476-1925 by R. B. Mowat.
9. THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE by E. F. Jacob.
10. A HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1815-1926 by D. C. Somervell.
11. A HISTORY OF GERMANY by W. Harbutt Dawson.
12. A HISTORY OF RUSSIA by Prince Mirsky.
13. A HISTORY OF ITALY by Mrs. G. M. Trevelyan.
14. A HISTORY OF THE U.S.A. by Professor Robert McElroy.
15. A HISTORY OF CHINA by Professor W. E. Soothill.
16. THE PAPACY by A. L. Maycock.
17. ANCIENT EGYPT by Arthur Weigall.
18. A HISTORY OF INDIA by Edward Thompson.
19. ISLAM by Sir E. Denison Ross.
20. THE REFORMATION by David Ogg.
21. THE PRESS by Sir Alfred Robbins.
22. RAILWAYS by Lord Monkswell.
23. ENGLISH WATER COLOUR PAINTERS by C. E. Hughes.
24. GREAT PHILOSOPHIES OF THE WORLD by C. E. M. Joad.
25. THE WAR ON LAND, 1914-18 by Douglas Jerrold.
26. BRITISH PRIME MINISTERS OF THE 18th CENTURY by Professor F. J. C. Hearnshaw.
27. CRIMINOLOGY by Horace Wyndham.
28. THE FRENCH NOVEL by Professor H. Ashton.
29. THE FREEWILL PROBLEM by Professor H. Wildon Carr.
30. THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION by Sir Sidney Low.
31. OCEANS AND RIVERS by Miss E. G. R. Taylor.
32. THE ENGLISH STAGE by Professor Allardyce Nicoll.
33. ENGLISH FOLKLORE by A. R. Wright.
34. ATHENS by E. H. Warmington.
35. THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE by Professor E. Weekley.
36. ASTROPHYSICS by W. M. Smart.
37. SCIENCE AND REALITY by Professor R. A. Sampson.
38. A HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1-455 by M. Cary.
39. THE ELIZABETHAN DRAMATISTS (except Shakespeare) by C. Sisson.
40. PRE-ROMAN BRITAIN by H. J. Massingham.
41. THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF ENGLAND by Prof. de Montmorency.
42. THE ISLAMIC FAITH by Sir Thomas Arnold.
43. DANTE by Professor C. Foligno.
44. A HISTORY OF JAPAN by J. Ingram Bryan.
45. INSECTS by Professor F. Balfour Browne.
46. THE BLACK DEATH by G. G. Coulton.
47. EARLY CHRISTIANITY AND ITS RIVALS by Canon G. H. Box.
48. ENGLISH ECONOMIC HISTORY by Elizabeth Levett.
49. MARRIAGE by Professor E. Westermarck.

(List continued on inside back cover.)

4.00
BENN'S SIXPENNY LIBRARY



THE INQUISITION

By G. G. COULTON, M.A.

Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, and University Lecturer in English.



LONDON: ERNEST BENN LIMITED
BOUVERIE HOUSE, FLEET ST. E.C.

First published 1929

MADE AND PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY
BILLING AND SONS, LTD., GUILDFORD AND ESHER

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I. ARE OPINIONS PUNISHABLE? -	-	5
II. THE PROGRESS OF INTOLERANCE	-	9
III. ENEMIES OF SOCIETY? -	-	20
IV. HERESY MANUFACTURED -	-	31
V. CHURCH AND STATE -	-	35
VI. THE STRUCTURE OF THE INQUISITION -	-	40
VII. THE ECONOMIC NEXUS -	-	45
VIII. DEATH AND TORTURE -	-	48
IX. REAPING THE WHIRLWIND -	-	57
X. HOW SHALL WE JUDGE? -	-	61
XI. ACTON AND AQUINAS -	-	67
XII. ALLEGED NECESSITIES -	-	72
XIII. REGRESSION AND DECAY -	-	76
BIBLIOGRAPHY -	-	80

PARTS of this study appeared in *The Edinburgh Review*, to the Proprietors and Editor of which the Author desires to express his thanks.

THE INQUISITION

CHAPTER I

ARE OPINIONS PUNISHABLE?

THIS subject has been so fully and scientifically studied during the last fifty years that we may speak with something like absolute certainty as to nearly all of the most important facts. The reader will see that my bibliography rests mainly upon the Quaker Lea, who set the ball rolling; Lord Acton, the greatest Roman Catholic historian who has written in the English language; a French Catholic canon; a French Catholic professor; and a distinguished French lawyer. Moreover, one of the most important documents, Bernard Gui's *Manual*, has been published quite recently in the original Latin, with a French translation, at a most moderate price. Space forbids my quoting much from this, but readers who are not specialists can now control modern writers by the exact words of a prominent inquisitor describing the theory and practice of his own office. The many acknowledged facts, however, still leave room for divergent deductions here and there; we know the ponderables, but there are imponderables more difficult to estimate. Whether we judge a man or an institution from the point of view of morals or of business expediency,

it is necessary to form some idea of his surroundings. Here, as I shall be found to differ on one point even from Dr. Lea, I shall take special pains to supply contemporary evidence which my readers may check.

The Inquisition was an elaborate institution for the punishment and suppression of unpopular opinions. We must begin, therefore, by asking: How far are opinions justly punishable?

It is often asserted that a man's words, as distinguished from his acts, cannot be justly punished; but can this thesis be seriously maintained? We must admit that innumerable injustices and blunders have been committed in the name of authority against free speech; but faults in practice do not necessarily vitiate a principle, and on what moral principle can a man claim freedom for all his words, while admitting responsibility for his acts? What is the value of a word which is not, in the strictest sense, a potential act? If I deliberately persuade another to shoot my enemy, am I not in every sense as guilty as if I deliberately fired the pistol myself? If a man deliberately declares war on society, planning himself and inciting others to plan a forcible attack upon existing institutions at the first favourable opportunity, with what justice can he complain when society meets this declaration of war by an act of war? saying, in effect: "Here and now is the opportunity you speak of; if not yours, certainly ours." If, in modern society, very few people are punished for their utterances (as apart from ordinary personal libels), this is because society can afford to give them wide latitude; the man himself

probably scarcely means what he says, or, if he does, he will influence so few others that we need not notice him. In other words, it is rather a question of expediency than of justice. If the speaker himself insists on appealing to justice; if he pleads, "my words must not be treated as acts," then he is pleading his own frivolity or insignificance. But those who feel this most strongly, and who would not for a moment defend the speaker on grounds of abstract justice, may yet protest against his punishment on the grounds of expediency. In view of past blunders, they may think it far wiser to suffer a small evil than to quench what, after all, may have a small chance of being true, and to make unnecessary martyrs. Therefore, the wisest and strongest societies, like the wisest and strongest individuals, have usually been distinguished by comparative tolerance. They have, in fact, felt that they can nearly always afford to take the interrupter at his own valuation, either as not meaning all that he says, or as unlikely to attract as many disciples as would suffice to convert the existing order into disorder. They do not need to reckon his words as acts; indeed, such treatment might give the words a factitious significance which, until then, they had lacked. Modern thought rightly regards intolerance as one of the worst enemies to civilization; but the first step to victory over our enemy is to understand him, and, in this question, much harm has been done by well-meaning writers who claim, in the name of abstract justice, that which most people would allow them as a matter of practical expediency.

Intolerance was neither invented nor raised to its highest power by Christians. Ernest Renan's *Averroës* shows how a brilliant Moslem civilization in Southern Spain was ruined by the intolerance of Moslem priests allied with the Moslem multitude. Nor, again, has intolerance been exclusively religious; indeed, as will be seen, that which on the surface has seemed religious has sometimes been partly or even mainly due to racial, social, and political differences. Plato himself, with the murder of Socrates before his eyes, was far from allowing complete tolerance. In his *Laws* he wrote :

“Let this then be the law: No one shall possess shrines of the gods in private houses, and he who is found to possess them, and perform any sacred rites not publicly authorized, shall be informed against to the guardians of the law; and let them issue orders that he shall carry his private rites to the public temples, and if he do not obey, let them inflict a penalty until he comply. And if a person be proven guilty of impiety, not merely from childish levity, but such as grown-up men may be guilty of, let him be punished with death.”

The object of the present monograph is to trace the application of this principle through the Middle Ages. For though, like Abbé Vacandard, I here choose the brief title *Inquisition*, yet, like him, I make no attempt to trace its history in the Spanish dominions or the Papal states after the Reformation. My subject here is the *Medieval Inquisition*.

CHAPTER II

THE PROGRESS OF INTOLERANCE

It was in virtue of principles like Plato's that the early Christians were persecuted. The Roman Empire, the most coherent state that had ever appeared in history on anything like that universal scale, seemed to its inhabitants to deserve a sort of religious reverence; therefore Roman Law, so indulgent to all other cults, was pitiless to the Christian, whose principles and practice seemed solvent of the existing society. Christianity, however, showed not only great resisting power, but equally remarkable genius for assimilation; and, in a few centuries, this forbidden Christian Church had modelled its life, its laws, its officers, so closely upon those of the Empire that Constantine recognized it as a worthy ally, and it became the State Church. Here, at once, intolerance began again to creep in; the older cults were now banned as "superstitiones"; they were presently condemned as illegal; and the temples, in process of time, were given over to a plunder far more complete, in proportion to population, than the plunderings of the Reformation. Moreover, the emperors could not stop there. The Christian was now privileged, but only as a part of this great quasi-imperial organization; the nonconformist Christians must not enjoy the favours intended only for an institution which, being officially organized, is responsible to the State and offers certain guarantees to the State. Thus the Church receives the legal right

of deciding between orthodox and heretic; those whom she casts out can claim no help from the State; indeed, as early as about 430, the laws of Theodosius II. proclaimed death, in the last resort, against certain heretics. Even earlier, in 385, the Emperor Maximus had tortured and executed the heretic Priscillian, with six of his followers. But this excited the indignation of two leading churchmen, St. Ambrose and St. Martin of Tours; and the significance of their saintly protest is not entirely destroyed by the fact that Pope Leo I., in 447, justified the act and wished that it might be repeated in other cases; or that it was cited again with express commendation, as a laudable precedent, by Hadrian VI. to the princes of Germany in 1522.

For, as time went on, the problem became more and more difficult. Violence was used freely both by orthodox and by heretics; and St. Augustine, who began by protesting against persecution in the case of the Donatists, ended by retracting; he thought force was necessary, in some cases, to bring men to a sense of the truth. But officially organized violence grew slowly, and not even steadily. During the Dark Ages, the imperial penalties for heretics, like many other imperial laws, were to a great extent, if not entirely, forgotten. Therefore, though men were far from tolerant, they were not so officially intolerant as might be expected. When, with that revival of learning which characterized the eleventh and twelfth centuries, heresy also became more prominent, it found the hierarchy undecided as to the use of force. In 1144, the Bishop of Liège formally consulted Pope Lucius II. as to the

proper penalty for heresy, but no answer has been recorded. Many heretics, in different parts of Europe, were put to death between 1020 and 1150; but more often by princes or by lynch-law than by regular ecclesiastical authority. We know of five cases in which prelates disapproved of this irregular violence, one of the protesters being St. Bernard; moreover, Petrus Cantor, far more distinguished morally and intellectually than the average of bishops, was of the same mind.

On the other hand, there are cases where the bishop explicitly or implicitly approves of handing heretics over for punishment to the mob or to the secular arm; and at least two of the most distinguished writers on ecclesiastical law approve of death for heretics. And then, in the second half of the twelfth century, the plot thickens. Heretics are more regularly burned, and prelates are more prominent in the executions; moreover, there is no bishop, I believe, who protests. The first formal laws which prescribed the stake (except those of the earlier Roman emperors, which were gradually being unearthed and emphasised) emanated from two or three sovereigns. It is possible that the Count of Toulouse decreed this before 1194; certainly the King of Aragon did in 1197 and the Emperor Frederick II. in 1224. The King of Aragon claimed to be acting here "in obedience to the decrees of the Holy Roman Church, which have prescribed that heretics should be excluded from the society of God and of Holy Church and of all Catholics, and should be everywhere condemned and prosecuted"—*ubique*

damnandos et persecuendos. And, by 1231, there is no longer any possible doubt of the papal attitude; Frederick's law was inscribed upon the official register, and in that year a batch of obstinate heretics were burnt at Rome. Then, between 1230 and 1233, Gregory IX. put the finishing touches to what modern scholars call the *Papal Inquisition*.

Lucius III., by a decree of 1184, had already created the *Episcopal Inquisition*. Heresy was thenceforward to be treated differently from all other crimes, and even from all other moral offences: far differently in degree, if not in quality. Bishops or their archdeacons had long been subject to the duty, not always accepted in practice, of inquiring into moral offences in every parish. This, it was now insisted, must henceforth be done in the most thorough and systematic fashion with regard to heresy. Such inquiry—*inquisitio*—must now be made twice or thrice a year in all parishes where the least suspicion exists; trustworthy residents shall be put on oath to denounce all suspects; even "the whole neighbourhood" may be thus sworn. The person thus "found marked by suspicion alone" must now prove his innocence to the bishop's satisfaction, or be handed over to the secular arm. No clerical immunities can protect him; the bishop, in this matter, may break down even those papal privileges which protect the exempt monks, in every other cause, from his inquiry or from his discipline. Finally, counts, barons, and civil magistrates must take a solemn oath to execute this edict, under pain of deposition, confiscation, and excommunication. In this way the whole

forces of Church and State were solemnly mobilized against heresy. But even these were found insufficient, and Innocent III. presently began the practice of sending commissioners of inquiry (*inquisitores*) direct from Rome to stimulate and support the fighting line, just as the French revolutionaries sent their commissioners to watch over and to spur on their generals. Then, at last, came those stricter laws of Gregory IX., which were supported by a corresponding development of organization. The Pope now regularly deputed inquisitors, nearly always chosen from the new and enthusiastic Mendicant Orders, to supersede the bishops; moreover, a special and centralized tribunal was set up, and here we have the full-blown Papal Inquisition.

How, then, are we to explain this rapid evolution within less than a century—that is, from Lucius II. (who apparently does not know what punishment faith or ethics demand for heretics, and who is certainly disinclined to trouble himself very much about the matter) to Gregory IX., who is quite certain that they are to be burned, and who musters and drills the orthodox against them, not only to the last man, but to the last child. For, under the Inquisition, just as the court has all the advantage of secret procedure, and concealment of witnesses, and torture not only of the suspect, but even of witnesses through whom there is any hope of securing a condemnation, so also an unfree man, or a criminal, is permitted or compelled to testify, and an infant not yet in his teens may be heard in evidence against his parents.

How are we to explain the rapidity of this evolu-

tion, as apart from its logical inevitability? For upon this inevitability in logic writers of all schools seem agreed. Each may emphasize some different point, but the theory itself may be set forth in fairly simple terms. Preachers and philosophers taught, and men in general believed, that the majority of mankind would find their way to hell.* They believed that, whereas heaven meant an eternity of bliss beyond all conception, hell meant an eternity of unthinkable horror and torment. Men were taught, also, that it was the last moment of a man's life which decided between these two tremendous alternatives; and, again, that the main factor at that moment, if not the only decisive factor, would be that of the soul's attitude towards the dogmas of the Roman Catholic Church. From this it followed necessarily, as Innocent III. publicly proclaimed, that the heretic deserves the same punishment as the man who betrays his sovereign; or, indeed,

* One of the assertions solemnly condemned as heretical in Raymond Lull, by Gregory XI., was: "God hath such love for His people that almost all men in the world shall be saved; since, if more were damned than saved, Christ's mercy would be without great love" (Eymeric, *Directorium*, pars. II., quæstio IX.; ed. 1585, p. 275 b.). (Even Aquinas, whose moderation is always conspicuous, contrasts the "few" saved with the "very many" damned. Other conspicuous and orthodox authorities put the proportion at one to a thousand, or even a hundred thousand (see my *Five Centuries of Religion*, vol. i., pp. 446ff.).

much more, "since it is far worse to offend the Eternal Majesty than a temporal ruler."

And the deductions from these premises were worked out, once for all, by St. Thomas Aquinas. We shall go more fully into his doctrine at a later stage; here we may note briefly that any baptized Christian who pertinaciously dissents from the official teaching becomes thereby a traitor of the blackest dye, to be punished by death. And here St. Thomas speaks practically as the unchallenged representative of scholastic philosophy. His conclusion follows inexorably from his premises; and those premises had been commonplaces of orthodox theology for centuries before his time.

Why, then, had not the popes or councils of those past centuries worked out this obvious line of thought and organized the Inquisition in practice? Here, at last, I must desert the ground of common agreement for the uncertain field of deductions, and suggest that the change came less through deeper speculation within the Church than through altered circumstances outside. Human nature being what it is, the boldest theoreticians must often be opportunists in practice; and perhaps no society has ever been more accommodating in its adaptation of theoretical strictness to actual human infirmities than the Roman Church. It may truly be pleaded that this is partly because her ideals are so high; but the fact of these startling contrasts would, I think, be difficult to deny. Just as at the present day, while Aquinas's are the orthodox conclusions, yet almost all the orthodox are concerned

to bury them in oblivion, so, during the Dark Ages, men had ignored the obvious justice of drawing those conclusions from generally-admitted premises. And, as influential modern Roman Catholic writers may be found here and there to confess that the burial has been merely opportunist, may we not reasonably suggest that the protracted gestation of the Inquisition, and then its sudden birth and growth, were equally conditioned by the circumstances of those times?

*same
age
men
women*

In the Dark Ages, people accepted the Church as they accepted Feudalism: each offered a refuge from anarchy. It was not that men weighed either one or the other in critical scales, or that they had in either case that higher conviction which is founded not only on belief but on understanding; the so-called Ages of Faith should really be called Ages of Acquiescence. But the Church undertook to defend the faithful against spiritual enemies, just as the lord undertook to defend his faithful vassals against bodily harm, in return for certain services. True, the Church was unquestionably the greater and more respected institution of the two: her ideals were higher, and she did much for men's bodies as well as for their souls. But the parallel is so far exact that, in the Dark Ages, each institution owed much of its power to the helplessness and disorganization of society in general; the old civilization was mostly destroyed, and the new was a tender plant ready to twine round any real support. Then came the Renaissance of the eleventh and twelfth centuries; and, by the middle of the

thirteenth, Western civilization had risen to what most people count as its medieval high-water mark. The latest orthodox historian of medieval philosophy writes of that time: "The thirteenth century believed that it had realized a state of stable equilibrium . . . their extraordinary optimism led them to believe they had arrived at a state close to perfection."*

This, though only a half-truth, is as just within its own limits as any epigram can be. The privileged classes of the thirteenth century, the clergy and nobles, were even better satisfied with the then constitution of society than were the classes privilégiées of the Ancien Régime in France before the Revolution. The reigning philosophers, and many of the most influential among the hierarchy, were deeply infected with that false sense of perfection. But De Wulf here ignores the very strong currents of quite unorthodox, and often anti-Christian, thought which ran all this while under the surface wherever philosophical and religious speculation was active, and especially at the University of Paris. What is more important, he ignores orthodox thinkers like Roger Bacon, who, as we shall see, criticized the philosophy of his contemporaries Aquinas and Albert the Great in words which might almost have been written by Huxley in our own day. Again, he ignores the vast mass of popular ignorance and indifference and incredulity, such as the Chronicle of Friar Salimbene reveals; when men heard how

* M. de Wulf, *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages* (1922), p. 268.

St. Louis had failed in his crusade of 1248, they said openly that Mahomet was greater now than Christ. The reigning party had, indeed, grown overweening in their confidence of having gradually welded ancient tradition into perfect truth, compared with which all else was error. But many intellectuals, after generations of more independent thought, had grown into a position from which such optimism seemed a mere delusion; and these men felt the more bitterly because, by publicly disputing this in the schools, they would have risked their lives. Partly in this way, and partly through contact with Mohammedans in the Crusades, many common folk had drifted into the position of Voltaire's valet: "I am a poor man, but I believe no more than my betters do."

We have seen how often, up to 1150 and even beyond, the heretic was executed by lynch-law. There can be no doubt that, as a rule, the people did greatly prefer the Church to these heretical conventicles; but we may doubt very seriously whether society in general, left to itself, would have proceeded to such extremes. The evidence enables us to exonerate a certain number (though by no means all) of the hierarchy; but, as a whole, these lynch stories imply the connivance, if not the active prompting, of the parish clergy. The most that can be drawn from the evidence is that enough men could often be found to lynch the nonconformists, and that the majority let the lynching go on. In short, our medieval evidence points rather to what we know to have happened in the case of the Quakers. Still, there can be no doubt

that the heretic of 1020-1120 was at least as unpopular as George Fox and his disciples. It was not necessary for pope or prince to burn heretics; the populace and lower clergy seemed to be doing enough in that way.

A little later the scene changed; and, if pope and prince did not interfere, it was rather the orthodox who were likely to suffer than the heretics. The most cultured populations of Western Europe—it became more and more clear—were rapidly losing their faith. Even St. Bernard, who scarcely ever failed to magnetize men, could gain no enduring victory over the heretics of Provence. Things went from bad to worse; and here we can rely fairly well upon Innocent III.'s own correspondence, and on the monk Peter des Vaux de Cernay who wrote his chronicle for Innocent's information. Heresy, these tell us, had become endemic in Provence; "almost all the barons had become harbourers and defenders of heretics," and there were "more disciples of Manichæus (*sic*) than of Christ." The heretics defended themselves against their rebukers by pointing to the notoriously evil lives of many clergy. I shall deal presently with the question how far this heresy may be characterized as social or political. The only point which concerns us here is one admitted by Abbé Vacandard, that the Inquisition "made no distinction between those teachings which entailed injury on the family and on society, and those which merely denied certain revealed truths" (p. 159). Any baptized person who pertinaciously opposed any papal Bull was finally amenable to its rigours; so that, as we shall see, four devoted

Franciscans were burned at Marseilles in 1318 for what was, in effect, a refusal to abjure an essential point of St. Francis's teaching in obedience to a brand-new papal decree which flatly contradicted another saint and a previous pope.

CHAPTER III

ENEMIES OF SOCIETY?

THIS underlying psychology of the Inquisition can be best understood, perhaps, if we start from that decree of Innocent III. which, without formally erecting the new court, did yet enunciate doctrines clearly implying the necessity of some such tribunal to enforce those doctrines in the last resort. In 1199, Innocent III. addressed a letter to the clergy, magistrates, and people of Viterbo, of which the essential portions were embodied in Canon Law, and thus became imperative for all Roman Christendom. Its preamble runs:

“The decay of a century tottering to old age may be scented in the corruption not only of the elements [of the universe], but even in that most worthy of all creatures, [man], fashioned in the image and likeness of God, and set above the fowls of the air and all the beasts of the field in privilege of dignity; nor does he merely fail in these days with the failing century, but he also infects and is infected with the

foul canker of old age. For man, most wretched, sinneth at the last; and he who, at his own creation and that of the world, could not remain in Paradise, is now degenerating in these days of dissolution for himself and the whole earth; and, at the end of time, (forgetting the price of his redemption, by thrusting himself into the manifold vain meshes of questioning) entangles himself in the snares of his own fraud, and falls into the pit which he hath digged. . . . Heresies swarm, and the heretic, robbing his brother of his heavenly inheritance, makes him heir to his own heresy and to damnation. . . . These, as the Apostle saith, 'have an appearance indeed of godliness, but deny the power thereof. . . .' [Heresy] was creeping privily like a cancer, and now it poureth forth openly the venom of its iniquity; for, under an apparent cloak of religion, it deceiveth many simple folk and seduceth some even of the wary."

Therefore Innocent III., as a man called at this eleventh hour of the world's existence to work in the Lord's vineyard, must fight manfully against the evil, and must demand from the faithful not opposition, but help. Any favourer of heretics shall be branded as infamous, and incapable of public office or councillorship; his vote shall be null, his testament null; if he be a judge, his judgment shall be without legal effect; if an advocate, let no judge hear him; if a notary, all his writings shall be void; "if a cleric, let him be deposed from all office and benefice." His whole possessions shall be confiscated; and any magistrate who neglects this duty shall be coerced by excommunication.

THE INQUISITION

"For, seeing that the laws, when men are condemned to death for high treason, confiscate their goods and reserve a livelihood for their children only as an act of mercy, how much more should those who, straying from the Faith, offend against Jesus Christ, God and Son of God, be cut off by ecclesiastical rigour from our Head, who is Christ, and be despoiled of their earthly goods, since it is far more grievous to sin against the eternal than against an earthly Majesty."

It was upon this last sentence that Aquinas based his famous argument: "If false coiners or other felons are justly committed to death without delay by worldly princes, much more may heretics, from the moment that they are convicted, be not only excommunicated, but slain justly out of hand." (2^a, 2^{ae}, q. XI., art. iii.)

From this memorable decree of Innocent III. three very important points stand clearly forth: his dogmatic optimism, his social pessimism, and as a result, his panic fear. What he, as pope, thought in the moral and religious sphere, and what he believed all good Christians to have believed from Christ onwards, was truth; everything else was falsehood. Yet, in his view, not only was human society then on its last legs, and the Second Advent close at hand, but even these few latest hours of mundane history were being embittered by the rapid growth of beliefs which, since they were incompatible with the One and Only Truth, must lead their advocates and their converts to hell. In those days of 1199 it was true that the saving dogmas of faith were being formulated more clearly than ever before; but, on the other hand,

unfaith in those dogmas was growing at an accelerated rate. The situation, therefore, was desperate; the only remedy was that the Church should strike now as she had never yet struck in all history; energy was the crying need—violent and even hysterical energy—*de l'audace, et encore de l'audace, et toujours de l'audace*—or the enemy would win after all!

This is the first step for the comprehension of the Inquisition. We must begin by realizing how, behind that imposing façade of the medieval Church, there lurked a crowd of misgivings, generally unconscious, not often even subconscious, still more seldom confessed, yet very deep all the while, and tyrannous in their action upon the orthodox mind. Berthold of Regensburg, the Franciscan mission preacher whom Roger Bacon singles out for such high praise, gives us an example of this subconscious misgiving:

“Had I a sister in a country wherein were only one heretic, yet that one heretic would keep me in fear for her . . . I myself, by God's grace, am as fast rooted in the Christian faith as any Christian man should rightly be; yet, rather than dwell knowingly one brief fortnight in the same house with an heretic, I would dwell a whole year with five hundred devils!”

So also his younger contemporary, the Dominican Étienne de Bourbon, complains that, while heretics pervert many from the Faith, none are ever re-con-~~verted~~. He explains it ingeniously: Wine may turn into vinegar, but never vinegar to wine. Berthold notes the same sad fact, but offers a different physical analogy. To pass now from those subconscious to

conscious misgivings in the thirteenth century; these are clearly shown by one of Joinville's most striking stories. A great doctor of divinity at Paris came and confessed to his bishop: "I hold myself for an infidel, since I cannot bring my heart to believe in the Sacrament of the Altar, as Holy Church teaches it; and I know well that this is one of the devil's temptations."*

A great monastic reformer of two centuries later, Johann Busch, speaks of this as a common temptation. In the face of these things, the question of comparative morality between heretic and orthodox, or even the question of saving the State from anti-social revolutionaries, sinks into the background. Why talk of the State, or even think of the State, which must soon perish with the whole fabric of this universe, when the Faith itself, the one supreme and imperishable thing in this perishable world, hangs on the hazard of a die? Indeed, one of the Faith's worst perils lies precisely in this seeming contrast between heretics who had "an appearance of godliness" and an admittedly corrupt clergy; for, on the evidence of Innocent III. and his own friends, and by the admission of all modern scholars, the clergy in general had indeed sunk very low.

Here, then, was still the same problem in 1196 as two generations earlier, when Provost Erwin of Steinfeld had written to consult St. Bernard about the Rhineland heretics. Erwin had described these men as

* *Mémoires*, § 46; I give similar examples on pp. 313, 404 of *From St. Francis to Dante*, 2nd. ed.

apparently inoffensive: they did, indeed, travel about with women, but so, he remembers, had the Apostles done; and he brings no accusation of actual impropriety. Again, it was admitted that in diet and other ways they showed an example of great self-restraint, and Erwin notes that these heretics constantly appealed to Christ's words as a criterion between themselves and the orthodox: "By their fruits ye shall know them." St. Bernard's answer shows how overwhelmingly the question of religious faith outweighs all other social or moral questions. He knows well enough how fateful this question of comparative morals is; he has laid elsewhere his finger on the open sore of the Church. He has written: "We can no longer say, with Isaiah, that 'the priest is as the people,' for the priests of our day are worse than the people." He admits these heretics' apparent regularity of life, and even their semblance of belief:

"If you inquire into [such a man's] faith, nothing is more Christian; if into his conversation, nothing is more blameless; and he proves by his deeds what he speaks with his mouth. You may see the man, in witness of his faith, frequenting the church, honouring the priests, offering his gift, making his confession, communicating in the sacraments. What can be more faithful? As regards life and morals, he cozens no man, over-reaches none, does violence to none. Moreover, he is pale with fasting; he eats no bread of idleness; he works with his hands for his livelihood. Where, then, is the fox?"

The allusion, of course, is to *Cant.* II., 15, and

St. Bernard explains how this man is one of the little foxes that must be caught, because they ravage the Lord's vineyard. This going about with women is very dangerous; he cannot, indeed, assert (though he suspects) that it has borne fruit in evil deeds, but certainly the Church has forbidden it; and it is wicked to appeal to the example of Apostles in the New Testament against the Church. Moreover, the one sin which heretics themselves cannot deny is that of giving holy things to the dogs. Thus St. Bernard, in his incautious contempt, practically repeats the Jewish argument of John, vii. 47: "Are ye also deceived? Have any of the rulers or of the Pharisees believed on him?" For he points out how these men, who presume to set up their ideas against the Church, "are a vile and rustic crew, unlettered, and altogether unwarlike"; their converts are "ignorant peasant women, and of such sort as I have always found all folk of this sect whom I have known as yet." Even their righteousness is but as filthy rags: "They do indeed abstain, but they abstain heretically." How, then, are they to be brought to this one all-saving Faith without which their good works are vain?

There was another tenet of these Rhineland non-conformists, in common with many other medieval heretics, which was most important for their then position in society, and is now most heavily emphasized by modern defenders of the Inquisition. Their abhorrence of oaths, it is argued nowadays, necessarily made the heretics into enemies of society, comparable to the Bolchevik of to-day; so that they

deserved punishment even more for social than for religious reasons. To quote from two quite recent authors, this heretical objection to oaths "struck at the whole feudal system"; and, again: "Remember that to deny the value of oaths was to attack the all-important feudal oath of allegiance, the one theoretical base of medieval society. Here was an explosive mixture indeed!" The plea is, I believe, not yet a century old; it never occurred to the earlier apologists; and we may easily test it by the direct testimony of medieval words and facts, in the days when the crisis was already severe enough to create deep heart-searchings, yet when thoughtful men were still free to speak their minds.

Petrus Cantor (c. 1180), one of the most pious and learned theologians of his time, fears that men are sinning against Christ when they themselves swear, or require oaths from others, in confirmation of the mere word *Yea* or *Nay*. He quotes with approval an early disciple, who, in similar circumstances, said: "I am a Christian, God forbid that I should swear!" He deplores the multiplication of judicial oaths in Christendom, since, through this practice, "we seem to be compelled to transgress God's command." He repudiates the plea of its practical utility, for a true Christian regards not expediency but principle. As a matter of fact, he disputes even its expediency; for, as he thinks, these judicial oaths are not unconnected with the terrible habit of blasphemous swearing in men's daily talk. Therefore, even though the total abstention from oaths may be a counsel of perfection,

why not aim at it? "Or, why, when a man does keep this counsel of perfection, do we at once denounce him as a Catharist?"* An excellent comment on these words is supplied by the evidence of an inquisitor who was at work about 1233. A suspect, brought before the tribunal, protested as follows in order to clear himself from all suspicion of heresy: "Hear me, my lords! I am no heretic, for I have a wife, and cohabit with her, and have children; and I eat flesh *and lie and swear and am a faithful Christian.*"† Those last crucial words have been omitted by two recent historians of the Inquisition; yet these are the real gist of the evidence, when we confront them with the complaints of medieval churchfolk that "modern" men are quite reckless of perjury, and that a small money-pledge, in "modern" society, is a far more efficacious guarantee than an oath. As Dr. Rashdall pointed out, men were sometimes actually required to take a second oath, to the effect that they would really keep the oath which they were about to take!

Feudal lords knew this well enough, and they knew that the heretics were not such anti-social pests as medieval inquisitors, hypnotized by religious zeal, naturally imagined, and as some modern writers, secure from contradiction by the actual victims, have described. It is true that many rulers persecuted them,

* *Verbum Abbreviatum*, cc. 80, 127 (Migne, P. L., vol. 205, coll. 241, 322).

† Guillelmi Pelisso's *Chronicon*; ed. Molinier, p. 17.

sometimes, no doubt, in their own direct political interest, but always under the far greater temptation of buying clerical support at the cheapest possible price: thus Frederick II. was perfectly willing to burn others for clumsily denying what he himself did not believe.* But the whole story of the Albigensian Crusade shows that the feudal rulers of the South, who knew the heretics well, had no rooted objection to them as subjects; some, indeed, preferred them to Catholics. If the Count of Toulouse had lent himself whole-heartedly to their extirpation; or, again, if many barons had not protected the Catharists and actually fought for them, the papal Crusade would never have been proclaimed. Even more significant, perhaps, is the attitude of Philip Augustus, the craftiest statesman of the day. If he had seen anything like Bolchevism, he would have felt his own crown, and the fidelity of his subjects, to be at stake in this matter. Yet, when Innocent called upon him urgently and repeatedly to draw his sword in God's cause, he steadily declined, except on terms which would secure him rich business profits. If he might first practically secure himself against loss by the war, and finally appropriate all the fruits of his conquest, then he was willing to proceed; otherwise, he saw no harm in leaving things as they were. And, finally, the papal and conciliar pronouncements bear witness

* It was part of his solemn pact in The Golden Bull of 1213, by which he bought the Pope's support, that Frederick should persecute heresy.

against this modern theory in their impatient and almost despairing tone. So little could the hierarchy count upon a general uprising against these enemies of all human society that every fresh papal statute testifies to widespread indifference, if not actual ill-will; for each breathes threatenings and slaughter against those princes and magistrates who are favouring heretics and resisting the Church.

It is quite true that some of the heretical doctrines, if strictly followed by all men, would have revolutionized society; but who ever saw a movement in which all men have acted fully up to their professed ideal? Moreover, one essential feature of nearly all the sects was a dualism as exaggerated as the dualism among the orthodox; a distinction between the *perfecti*, whose asceticism was extreme, and the mass of *credentes*, who were pledged to nothing so revolutionary. If all Europe had become Catharist, or Waldensian, there is no reason to believe that the *perfecti* would have been more numerous than the monks, or that their hatred of marriage (for instance) would have gone farther than monasticism did to depopulate the world. We must remember, too, the onesidedness of the surviving evidence against these men; and then we can scarcely deny that the early Christians themselves, if we were to judge only from a few Bible texts selected by their enemies, and from confessions under torture or fear of torture, and from the evidence of renegades, might almost as easily be represented as enemies of the human race. Lord Acton noted that Lea, in his anxiety to be

impartial, was sometimes over-indulgent to the persecutors; and this seems to me to be a case in point. For Innocent's own letters, and the writings of the Inquisitors themselves, show that the orthodox of the thirteenth century were as much embarrassed by the outward appearance of moral superiority among these heretics as St. Bernard had been a hundred years earlier.

CHAPTER IV

HERESY MANUFACTURED

WE see this far more plainly if we turn from the Catharists to the Waldensians and the Fraticelli, who, from the mid-fourteenth century onwards, will be found exercising the Inquisitors almost, if not quite, as much as the Cathari. Each of these sects was, by modern standards, most innocent in its first origin; and their history, with that of many others in the Middle Ages, disproves one of the most frequently quoted of Macaulay's judgments, that Rome has always known, better than other Churches, how to enlist enthusiasm. Darwin, for some time, wondered why the fields round his house were not full of self-sown firs, considering the number of fir woods all round. On closer inspection, he gradually discovered that the pastures were, in fact, full of tiny firs, which the cattle regularly cropped as they grew. A similar study of medieval documents would have revealed to

Macaulay a multitude of budding heresies, of which only a small proportion managed to struggle through persecution to some noticeable size. Among this minority were the Waldenses and the Fraticelli.

✓ Peter Waldo was a rich merchant of Lyons, already one of the busiest industrial and mercantile cities in Europe. He was converted late in life by hearing a jongleur recite, not a love-lay or a satire, but the story of St. Alexis. He now became curious to know the meaning of the lessons that had been recited hundreds of times before him in church, therefore he paid a priest first to translate these for him, then the whole Bible, or at least considerable portions, and then a number of "sentences" from the Fathers. He dowered his wife, settled his daughters as nuns, gave the rest of his goods to the poor, and began to preach the Gospel which he believed himself to have learned. He and his followers were not treated harshly at first, but their preaching soon came into conflict with some of the parish clergy; then the Archbishop forbade them. They appealed to Rome, and were heard not altogether unsympathetically; but here, also, they were finally condemned. Presently, therefore, we find them compelled, as outlaws, to join forces in many cases with the far more unorthodox Cathari, whom at first they had combated.

So, also, with the Fraticelli. These were developed from the left wing of the "Spiritual" Franciscans; and the "Spirituals" were those who adhered to the original strictness of the Rule, with only such exaggerations as were natural, so soon as the question had

become strongly political. It is admitted on all hands that these Spirituals adhered to the Rule which they had vowed, while the majority, the Conventuals, permitted relaxations which St. Francis himself, in anticipation of these temptations, had most definitely forbidden. It is admitted also that the earlier popes, and the Ecumenical Council of Vienne in 1311, practically decided in favour of the Spirituals. Yet John XXII. not only took the side of the relaxed majority, but definitely insisted, as a matter of loyalty, that these pious, if unnecessarily obstinate, ascetics should obey the commands of their laxer superiors, even on points which (as all men knew, or might have known) were as contrary to the letter as to the spirit of St. Francis's Rule. From that time forward, a new heresy was invented, the heresy of adhering strictly to a religious Rule which all had sworn, but which the majority found inconvenient to keep. This heresy is not only specified, point by point, in the judgment passed upon the four Franciscans burned at Marseilles in 1318, but Bernard Gui notes it in his "manual" for the instruction of fellow-inquisitors. Anyone, he says, is a heretic who maintains that "the Pope has no right to give dispensations, contrary to the Rule of St. Francis, concerning the size and the cost of the Franciscan frocks—that is, he cannot license them to possess anything superfluous; and the Franciscans are not bound to obey him on this or on any other point which is contrary to the perfection of St. Francis's Rule" (vol. i., p. 126). This Bull of John XXII. initiated a wholesale persecution; many Spirituals were thus driven into

open revolt, and this revolutionary minority were called *Fraticelli* ("Little Brethren"). One of their fundamental tenets became this, that John XXII. had fallen into open heresy, and that his successors were, therefore, no true popes. In these and similar ways heresy was frequently created in the Middle Ages; not that the nonconformists were originally anti-ecclesiastical or even anti-clerical, but that their innocent, or at worst eccentric ideas were treated as crimes, and thus the men were driven to consort with others whose quarrel with the Church was fundamental. For instance, all men might be condemned as heretics who remained a whole year under excommunication without procuring absolution. But records of official visitations show a startling proportion of the community who were under excommunication for neglect of their yearly confession and communion, quite apart from the large numbers who had not paid their tithes in full. It is likely that the heresy-laws were seldom or never applied to the former class, yet the latter, sometimes at least, were treated more seriously. A large proportion of the suspects brought before the Inquisition at Pamiers came from one small mountainous district, where there had been a wide-spread refusal to pay certain tithes; and one of them complained that this heresy-hunting dated "from the time when the men of Savarthes were excommunicated by the Bishop or his official, because the said men refused to pay the tithes and the firstfruits of their cattle." And this is corroborated to some extent by the official register, where the eighty-third case is that

of "Peter the Tailor, suspected and informed against for heresy by reason of certain heretical words." The witnesses deposed only that he had spoken ill of the priests and of the tithes; Vidal has no doubt that he was condemned to imprisonment (p. 54; *cf.*, 112, 122, 190). Thus the law lent itself to the most dangerous constructions: "Often a mere indication rendered a man suspect of heresy" (Vidal, p. 143). Therefore we shall see how, at a fairly early stage, this deadly religious machine was turned to political uses. And this paradox will become even more startling, if we go back now to St. Bernard's day and note how overwhelmingly predominant the religious factor was in the mind of those men who gradually built up the Inquisition.

CHAPTER V

CHURCH AND STATE

ST. BERNARD had heartily disapproved of lynch-law: "Faith must be persuaded to men, and not imposed upon them." Historians have been too prone to quote that noble word, mainly at secondhand from each other, without even reading the next sentence, in which St. Bernard foreshadows plainly the choice that lay finally before Innocent III. For he adds: "Yet it would be better that they were coerced by the sword of that [magistrate] who beareth not the

sword in vain, than that they should be suffered to bring many others into their own error. 'For he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.' " And this quotation from Romans, xiii. 4, is reinforced by other passages in those two sermons of his (the sixty-fourth and sixty-fifth of the series on the *Canticle of Canticles*) approving the banishment or imprisonment of all heretics who preach their doctrines openly. Even St. Bernard, therefore, could not go farther in tolerance than this, considering the overwhelming super-importance of dogmatic faith; and Innocent III. could not even go so far. The two intervening generations had shown that, if it came to St. Bernard's trial of mere persuasion, the heretics were more likely to win than the faithful. Indeed, by the time of Innocent III., as he himself complained, they were already grown to a majority in Southern France. St. Bernard, in such a case, would doubtless have decided with Innocent: the salvation of the people is the highest law of all—*salus populi suprema lex*—here is the field of Armageddon; in this last and desperate conflict, no weapon must be left idle; we must be ruthless to bodies where souls are to be saved.

Therefore it was that Innocent III., at the Ecumenical Lateran Council of 1215, proclaimed the severest measures in his decree *Excommunicamus*. Strict inquiry must be made everywhere; mere suspects must prove their innocence or recant or finally be condemned; and all civil authorities must be compelled, on pain of heresy themselves, to swear

publicly "that they will strive in good faith, to the utmost of their power, to exterminate from the lands subject to their obedience all heretics who have been marked by the Church." And one of the main errors which calls for these desperate measures is disbelief in Transubstantiation.

From this it will be seen how false it is to represent the Inquisition mainly as a bulwark against social anarchy, or even to suggest that the needs of the State were here comparable with those of the Church. The fact that the pope, when once he felt the necessity of declaring war against heresy, was in fact able to count upon enlisting a sufficient army of layfolk to back him up, is no proof that these layfolk were in the forefront of the battle: they were rather in the position of the German people in 1914, when once the Kaiser had decided to mobilize. But a pope like Innocent III., and a philosopher like Aquinas, were far more concerned for men's morals than for the framework of the civil State. And even morals sank into insignificance before Faith. Innocent III. preached no crusade against the immoral Archbishops of Narbonne and Auch. The list of their sins was terrible, and he publicly recognized that such ecclesiastical sinners supplied the greatest force to the heretics; yet both Archbishops were suffered to continue in their office for more than twenty years. The Church could easily have commanded the physical force necessary to expel these episcopal sinners, if that had indeed been her first and main concern. Instead of this, she levied her armies against

in the doctrine

the religious nonconformists, even though St. Bernard had tacitly admitted that, outwardly at least, these men's morals contrasted favourably with those of the clergy. With Innocent III., who, with all his greatness, was a man of his time, Faith came first in importance, Morals second (in so far as they can be judged by men's outward actions), and Civilization a bad third.

For instance, Raymond Lull's proposition that God, in His mercy, would save more souls than He damned, cannot in any sense be called antinomian or anti-social. On the contrary, in our modern society, which is far more law-abiding on the whole than medieval society ever was, the enormous majority of all creeds would probably side rather with Lull than with Aquinas on that point; and they would certainly repudiate Berthold of Regensburg, who, with implicit medieval approval, calculated the chances of salvation at one in a hundred thousand. Yet any unrepentant believer in Lull's proposition came as definitely under the ban of the Inquisition, and was as inevitably doomed to the stake, as an Albigensian who might condemn flesh-eating and marriage and oaths as mortal sins, and who might be ready to take up arms in defence of those doctrines. Good Friar Berthold's estimate, when we consider its real implications, was far more anti-social than even that violent outburst of a weaver at Toulouse in 1247: "If I could lay hold on that god who, out of a thousand men whom he had made, should save one and damn all the rest, then I would tear and rend him tooth and nail as a

traitor, and would count him for a false traitor and spit in his face.”* To Innocent, and to the inquisitors after him, the mere framework of civil society was a thing temporary and insignificant compared with the Church.

It is sometimes argued that this is idle academic logic-chopping; that, as a matter of fact and practice, medieval Church and State were simply two aspects of the same society, and that he who attacked the one necessarily attacked the other: “No Church, no king,” in the most absolute meaning of that maxim. There is a half-truth here; but those who argue from it as a complete and final verity go farther astray, perhaps, than those others who have neglected it altogether. In spite of medieval academic theories, Church and State were seldom, if ever, identical and absolutely harmonious in practice. Indeed, their frequent rivalries and discords are perhaps even more significant for social history than their concord. It is true that each, when attacked from outside, was glad to invoke the other as ally: “If you touch me, the State, you attack the very foundations of religion”; or, “If you touch me, the Church, you attack the very foundations of human society.” But such words as these have not survived the acid test of experience.

Four centuries ago, the medieval Church was revolutionized. At the present day, even its nominal adherents number only about one-third of the

* Douais, *Documents*, etc., Vol. II. (1900), p. 100.

Caucasian race and not one-sixth of the whole world. Moreover, even within the Church itself, there have been revulsions of thought on points which are of capital importance for human destiny. Yet civil society has not fallen to pieces; on the contrary, it secures far completer obedience to its laws, with far less exertion or friction, than it secured before the Reformation. However, it has needed the experience of many years to establish this truth; and, in 1200, most men admitted in theory, and were frequently willing to admit in practice, the quasi-identity of Church and State. From this it followed, as a matter of course, that those who could not conform to the Church were ordinarily punished by the State, and (if the Church so decided) even to the death.

CHAPTER VI

THE STRUCTURE OF THE INQUISITION

LET us now look into the actual machinery of the Inquisition. That institution had, from the outset, this enormous power, that it fell in with the interests of all ecclesiastics and of many lay magistrates; moreover, it could trade upon popular beliefs and popular superstitions. Thus it had all the fighting force of patriotism in the narrowest and intensest form. And, from the point of view of procedure, this court was unique, even though scarcely any of its separate con-

stituents were new.* The man who first combined charcoal, saltpetre, and sulphur made a new and devastating compound; so also this medieval combination of many scattered juridical tyrannies formed a compound of unexampled violence.

(1) The general theory of the procedure was adapted from Roman Imperial law. It amounts, briefly, to this: That, whereas modern English law presumes a man's innocence until his guilt is proved, the Inquisition assumed his guilt unless he could prove innocence. Public report (often defined as a belief of half a dozen trustworthy persons) had branded him as suspect; he must dissipate that suspicion or be condemned. (2) His judges were purely ecclesiastical: the civil power tried vainly to assert the right even of consulting the documents. (3) The procedure was secret. (4) The names of witnesses were also generally concealed; the accused had no chance of challenging them as partial or infamous persons. (5) Indeed, infamous persons were expressly allowed to testify in this court, though in other courts their testimony was refused. So, again, children were heard, even against their parents. This, however, was only in favour of the prosecution; neither infamous persons nor infants might be heard

*It is sometimes asserted that *none* were new; but Alphandéry quotes pertinently from the most systematic of medieval inquisitors, Bernard Gui, who says that in the procedure of the Inquisition there are "many peculiarities" [*multa specialia*].

in defence. (6) Advocates were nominally allowed at first; but it was made a punishable crime to appear in defence of a guilty person; and this was so shamelessly pressed that, finally, even the pretence of advocacy was abandoned. (7) Again, it was quite useless to count on witnesses for the defence; and this is natural, for they would be practically certain to be suspected of complicity as abettors of the heretics. (8) Torture might be inflicted not only on the suspect, but also on any witnesses from whom it was hoped to get evidence against him. (9) Such torture had practically no legal limits. It was, indeed, forbidden to "repeat" torture; but the man who had been racked on Monday might be racked again on Tuesday under colour of the word "continuance." (10) A very small nonconformity might be magnified into a crime punishable by death. Bernard Gui's Register contains other cases like this following (p. 10): "Bernard of Bar, as we are certified by his lawful confession made in our court, saw heretics in his own house, to wit Jacques Autier and Peter his father; and once he heard the said Jacques read in a certain book of the Gospels and Epistles, as he said; after which the said heretic Jacques wished that he and others should do obeisance to him [*adorarent*]. And he himself, with the rest, did obeisance, bowing himself thrice upon a bench and saying, *Benedicite!* and the heretic answered: *God bless you!* Being examined concerning the belief of the heretics, he answered that he did not believe in them. He did not confess these things until he was taken and put into

prison." By this confession he escaped the stake, and prison, but was condemned to wear the cross of infamy. (11) Beyond this, the theory of "constructive heresy" was pushed to its farthest limits. Any apparent want of respect for the Church might form a *prima facie* ground for suspicion. Again, whereas the persecutor Trajan had forbidden Pliny to seek out the secret Christian, yet the Inquisition compelled every man to spy upon his neighbour's secrets. Neglect of tale-bearing was, in itself, constructive heresy.* A heretic who abjured, and thus exchanged the stake for prison, was obliged first to promise that he "would persecute the heretics, and inform against them, and reveal them wherever he knew them to be" (*ibid.*, p. 78).

When we realize that there were other minor rigours beyond these, it will be easily understood that an acquittal, pure and simple, is practically unheard of in these records. Seldom was there any less punishment than the cross of infamy, which may be described in Bernard Gui's own words (*ibid.*, p. 13): "We enjoin for your penance the wearing of two

* Vidal, p. 144: "Tale-bearing is the Inquisitor's ordinary method of collecting evidence, if not the certitude of guilt. Every faithful Catholic's duty is to practise this. The Council of Toulouse in 1229 decreed that 'males above 14, and females above 12 years of age, must swear that they will do their best to prosecute heretics, and will denounce them in all good faith.'" Cf. B. Gui, vol. i., p. lxiii., 17, 31.

crosses of yellow felt, one in front and one behind, on each of your garments except your shirt. You shall never go about, whether indoors or without, but with these crosses visible; one arm of each shall be two and a half palms in length, and the other two palms; and each arm shall be of three fingers' breadth; and, if they be torn or outworn, you shall repair them." On this Vidal remarks (p. 241): "The multitude spared neither insults nor mockery to those who bore this token of salvation as a sign of infamy. They were pointed at with the finger of scorn; men avoided their company and refused all alliance with them and their children. In spite of the remonstrances of prelates and Inquisitors pleading on their behalf, they were treated as parias. The Inquisition often consented to remit or commute this penance." Yet this was only at a later stage. Out of the 200 cases registered at Carcassonne in 1249-1258, there is not a single acquittal; the most we get, and that very rarely, is a "not proven," and sometimes the trial is renewed on a later occasion. But, just as men rarely use their full opportunities for good, so they seldom do all the evil within their power. Torquemada, indeed, is recorded on good authority to have burned 2,000 heretics; but Bernard Gui, one of the most active of medieval inquisitors, who in his lifetime convicted 930, committed only 42 to the stake. Of the rest, 307 were condemned to prison, and all were liable to total confiscation of their goods.

Thus, from the purely business point of view,^s confiscation and the stake and torture were the main

STRUCTURE OF THE INQUISITION 45
pillars of the Inquisition. Without the last two it could never have worked efficiently; without the first, it could never have paid its way except at rare moments of general religious enthusiasm. Heresy, even where it was not aggressive, was so widespread in different forms, and the masses, in their dull way, have such immense power of passive resistance that victory could never have been assured without the deadliest weapons and a well-filled war-chest.

CHAPTER VII

THE ECONOMIC NEXUS

THEREFORE, while the life of a penitent heretic was spared (unless, indeed, he had once relapsed, in which case, by the strict law, no penitence could save him from the stake), his money was forfeited in any case. Even if he confessed when accused before the Inquisition, and came into the fold of his own free will, yet all his possessions had ceased to be his from the mere fact that he had been an accused heretic. It is true that the full forfeit was not always exacted; yet there could be no relaxation but by a special act of mercy; and the probability is that, in these cases, he had to compound for the whole by willing abandonment of a large part. As Lea writes (vol. i., p. 517): "So assured were the officials that condemnation would follow trial, that they frequently

did not await the result, but carried out the confiscation in advance. . . . The Inquisition so habituated men's minds to the belief that no one escaped who had once fallen into its hands, that the officials considered themselves safe in acting upon the presumption." It is hardly necessary to emphasize the demoralization which was likely to follow upon this abuse of a nominally spiritual institution. One of our chief witnesses here is a champion of orthodoxy, Alvarus Pelagius, Franciscan friar and Papal Penitentiary, who gives a gloomy picture of medieval society as it appeared to an ardent papalist a few years before the Black Death fell upon Europe. His fellow-friars (Alvarus tells us), when they are employed against heretics, regularly pocket the spoils of their victims: "Wherein these Inquisitors commit two mortal sins; for whereas, by papal privilege, this money [earned by the] inquisitor ought to be divided into three parts, one for the government of the land wherein the heretic dwelt, another to the officials of the Holy Office, and the third for the diocesan bishop to keep for necessary expenses of the Inquisition, yet these Inquisitors, though no share has [thus] been assigned to any one of them, usurp the whole for themselves, even though the Roman Church assigns to them no part for their expenses; and thus they are truly thieves and robbers of the Inquisition money, usurping it beside and against the will of the Roman Pontiffs, and spending it abusively at their own pleasure upon their brethren and their kinsfolk. Their second sin is that, whereas they ought to be Friars

Minor and touch no money, yet they spend it as they please, and think themselves to be making a holy offering to God when they give alms of this money to their friaries or their brethren, literally of the mammon of iniquity—that is, of other men's money. And a third sin also, that they scarce punish any man accused of heresy except by condemning him to lose his money, in order that they may put it into their own purses [*ut eam imburseant*].* Therefore, I can scarce believe that any one of them escapeth that papal excommunication which is rehearsed in Canon Law.”† But this steady process of spoliation necessarily dried up the very sources after a few generations; and we have a pathetic complaint from the Inquisitor Eymeric in 1375: “In our days there are no more rich heretics; so that princes, not seeing much money in prospect, will not put themselves to any expense; it is a pity that so salutary an institution as ours should be so uncertain of its future” (p. 204).

* This, of course, goes far to explain why only the smaller fraction were executed. The inquisitors, like the juries under the old English felony laws, were willing to overlook many chances of executing a man, but were less ready to abandon their legal advantages in money matters.

† *De Planctu Ecclesiæ*, Lib. II., c. 77 (ed. 1517, fol. 219 b.).

CHAPTER VIII

DEATH AND TORTURE

IN the matter of bloodshed, again, we have seen how far the Church drifted from St. Bernard's maxim: "Faith must be persuaded to men, and not imposed upon them." On this point, modern scholars are now agreed. It was possible for Count Joseph de Maistre, whose book laid the foundation of modern apologies for the Inquisition, but who wrote in an age of unscientific history, to contend that there was no real abandonment of the Church's principle. He counts "among the innumerable errors propagated by the eighteenth century" "the belief of the ignorant multitude that priests could condemn a man to death!" "Never did the priest raise a scaffold; he mounts the scaffold only as a martyr or a consoler" (pp. 17, 18). To this we may oppose the verdict of Abbé Vacandard, a writer no less orthodox, but far more familiar with medieval facts.

He writes: "Modern apologists . . . have tried their best to show that the execution of heretics was solely the work of the civil power, and that the Church was in no way responsible. . . . The real share of the Inquisition in the condemnation involving the death penalty is indeed a very difficult question to determine. According to the letter of the papal and imperial Constitutions of 1231 and 1232, the civil and not the ecclesiastical tribunals assumed all responsi-

bility for the death sentence; the Inquisition merely decided upon the question of doctrine, leaving the rest to the secular court. It is this legislation that the above-named apologists have in mind, and the text of these laws is on their side. But when we consider how these laws were carried out in practice, we must admit that the Church did have some share in the death sentence. We have already seen that the Church excommunicated those princes who refused to burn the heretics which the Inquisition handed over to them. The princes were not really judges in this case; the right to consider questions of heresy was formally denied them. It was their duty simply to register the decree of the Church, and to enforce it according to the civil law. In every execution, therefore, a two-fold authority came into play: the civil power which carried out its own laws, and the spiritual power which forced the State to carry them out. That is why Peter Cantor declared that the Cathari ought not to be put to death after an ecclesiastical trial, lest the Church be compromised: '*Illud ab eo fit, cujus auctoritate fit,*' he said, to justify his recommendation. It is, therefore, erroneous to pretend that the Church had absolutely no part in the condemnation of heretics to death. It is true that this participation of hers was not direct and immediate; but even though indirect, it was none the less real and efficacious. The judges of the Inquisition realized this and did their best to free themselves of this responsibility, which weighed rather heavily upon them. Some maintained that, in compelling the civil authority to enforce the existing

laws, they were not going outside their spiritual office, but were merely deciding a case of conscience. But this theory was unsatisfactory. To reassure their consciences, they tried another expedient. In abandoning heretics to the secular arm, they besought the State officials to act with moderation, and avoid 'all bloodshed and all danger of death.' This was, unfortunately, an empty formula which deceived no one. It was intended to safeguard the principle which the Church had taken for her motto: *Ecclesia abhorret a sanguine*. In strongly asserting this traditional law, the Inquisitors imagined that they thereby freed themselves from all responsibility, and kept from imbruing their hands in bloodshed. We must take this for what it is worth. It has been styled 'cunning' and 'hypocrisy'; let us call it simply a legal fiction."*

Vidal, again, speaks no less unhesitatingly from his study of original sources. "The Inquisition did not herself light the faggots; that job was reserved for the secular arm. But everybody knew that the dreadful euphemism, 'we abandon thee to the secular court,' was equivalent to a death sentence. Nobody, again, was deceived by the platonic formula behind which the judge strove to shelter his dignity: 'We abandon thee to the secular arm, beseeching it affec-

* Pp. 241 ff; cf. 178-80, where he quotes two first-rate medieval authorities who abandon the legal fiction altogether, and speak of heretics whom "the Inquisitors caused to be burned."

tionately, as Canon Law requires, that the sentence of the civil judges may spare you death or mutilation.' Let us for a moment suppose that the civil magistrate had taken this recommendation literally, what penalty would he have pronounced against the poor wretches who were handed over to him? No doubt he could have condemned them to prison for life; but the Inquisition did not need him for that job, and she was not accustomed to confide the custody of her prisoners to other folk than her own. She had her own dungeons, and was very jealous of them. The clause which we are discussing, therefore, was merely illusory; the impenitent heretic was always put to death" (p. 236). De Cauzons is no less explicit. "It might be thought, in accordance with these principles [enunciated by churchmen], that the Church was passive with regard to the death penalty. But such was not the case. Though, at least as far as we know, bishops and clergy very seldom pronounced the death penalty *directly*, yet they knew quite well what the sentence of their own tribunals meant and the consequences which fatally followed when they cut off a heretic from the Church and 'released' him (that is, handed him over) to the secular arm." Even in earlier days (continues De Cauzons) they knew that this often, if not always, meant death; and, when once the Inquisition had been founded, "if a suzerain lord would not put heretics to death, this became a brand of unorthodoxy. As to a judge, if he did not pronounce the death penalty demanded by law, he thus proclaimed himself a heretic, and was

exposed first to censure, then to prosecution in his own person. Therefore, it was not the State alone which had to answer for the blood that was shed; the Church demanded bloodshed too energetically to escape from her share of responsibility in that series of executions which were so long inflicted upon heretics" (vol. i., pp. 486-8).

Equally definite is the responsibility for torture. Civil tribunals had used it sporadically; but it was the Inquisition which systematized and perpetuated it; and we cannot plead that this step was taken in ignorance, or that the atmosphere of that age was such as to lead naturally to this advance in barbarity. For, even in the thirteenth century, moralists realized what torture and death meant; and some consciences were not altogether easy in this matter. It was not only that the laity complained here; as, for instance, in 1306, the citizens of Albi, Carcassonne, and Cordes complained to Clement V. that some suspects "are so oppressed with anguish of prison, and lack of bedding and starvation and question by torture, that they are forced to give up the ghost"; and, again, "it is reported . . . that the written evidence is changed, added, or suppressed, and that confessions extorted by torture are inserted with the rest."* Apart

* Prof. Vidal, pp. 172-3. It will be seen that I make considerable use of this monograph, already difficult to procure, for two reasons. It is a penetrating study of the methods of an excellent bishop, who afterwards became perhaps the best of all fourteenth-

from all anti-clerical feeling, there was a misgiving in some clerical minds which could not altogether be stifled; thinking folk could not help recognizing that a man might be easily tempted to confess falsehood in order to escape torment altogether or to procure a respite from the intolerable pain. There again, therefore, the Inquisition fell back upon a hollow subterfuge. The victim was first removed from sight of the rack, and then presented with a memorandum which he was required to sign with an explanatory postscript to the effect that this "second" confession was made "freely and spontaneously, without the pressure of force or fear." Lea quotes a case where the Inquisition records actually give the lie to these words; and Vidal, citing a similar case within his own observation, adds: "It must be admitted that this formula is cruelly inaccurate" (p. 175). And he reminds us of the almost unbounded freedom enjoyed in this domain by the inquisitors. "As to the guarantees which the victim might claim in his favour, they depended upon the goodwill and conscience of his judges. . . . Neither age nor sex availed; women and children and old men were tortured. In Italy, they were more indulgent with children; these were spared up to the age of nine, and, after that age, beaten with a rod. Some notice was taken of sickness and bodily weakness; the

century popes, under the name of Benedict XII. On the other hand, the author is above all suspicion of anti-Catholic bias.

doctor of the Inquisition decided what kind of torture should be chosen in such cases" (pp. 177-9). Moreover (as the above-quoted complaint from Albi suggests), prison itself was used as a form of torture.* In many cases the dungeons of the Inquisition may have been even a trifle better than some other secular prisons; but that is not saying much. The Consuls of Carcassonne, in their official protest of 1286, described the inquisitors' dungeons there. "Some are so dark and airless that the inmates cannot tell night from day; and thus they are in perpetual lack of air and complete darkness. In others are poor wretches in manacles of iron or wood, unable to move, sitting in their own filth, and unable to lie except on their backs upon the cold earth; and they are kept for a long time in these torments, day and night. In other dungeons there is not only lack of light and air but also of food, except the bread and water of affliction, which itself is given most scantily." Vidal adds: "The Cardinals [sent by the Pope to inquire] verified with their own eyes, in 1306, that these complaints were only too well founded. . . . [One of them] visited also the prison at Albi, which offered no better accommodation. . . . Things were no better in that of Toulouse" (pp. 228-9). This explains why the

* Vidal gives concrete cases—*e.g.*, one woman "was kept in prison because she had not confessed herself guilty"; another was told by the bishop "unless you confess the truth, you shall go to prison" (p. 167).

Inquisitor Bernard Gui recommends: "Those who are vehemently suspected should be kept in prison until they have confessed the truth." They must not be allowed to talk together, for thus they only grow more obstinate in error, but by solitary confinement "it would be easier to force the truth from them. . . . I have seen this by experience, in a man who was nearly two years in prison, and often examined; yet he quibbled and refused to confess the truth, until, at last, he revealed and disclosed it and repented, and was condemned to fulfil his penance in prison as a penitent heretic" (vol. i., p. 106). It may easily be imagined that, in many cases, prison itself was not needed; the very threat must often have been effectual.

We may see now why Sir John Fortescue, in 1470, reckoned the absence of torture in England as one of our most precious national assets;* for the Inquisition had (as will presently be seen) worked among us only for a few months, in the matter of the Templars. The relation between torture and truth, in that Templar case, as conducted in France, is, fortunately, easy to trace. Prisoners confessed that, on their admission to the Order, they had adored an idol Baphomet, by way of denying the Christian God. Yet not only did no two descriptions of this idol agree, but, though the Templars' houses were seized and sealed by the royal officials, no single idol was found

* *De Laudibus Legum Angliæ*, ch. xxii. (ed. 1616, p. 46). I have printed the whole passage on p. 517 of *Social Life in Britain* (1918).

anywhere. Here, however, it may be more to the point to quote another instance, far less known yet far more poignant in its tragedy. When once well-meaning folk like the Waldenses and Fraticelli had been driven underground, it was easy to invent any lies about them. Men accused them of promiscuous lust in their secret conventicles; or of an abomination called *barilotto*, which added to this promiscuity the crime of roasting a new-born child in public at a fire and drinking a sacramental cup mingled with the ashes. One unhappy Italian peasant, Antonio da Sacco (A.D. 1466), persistently denied complicity in this crime, until torture extorted a confession from him. Then, "as soon as he was taken off the rack, he denied that he had ever been at the *barilotto*, but he had indeed heard talk [of it]." He recognized now, however, that he had previously obeyed the devil; he was willing now to confess to the orthodox priests, and to serve the Pope "in any service, even in the stable and in double chains." This crawling surrender, said his judges, was an evident victory for the truth: "for the holy martyrs, who suffered for the true Faith, not only feared no torments, but laughed at them and overcame them; yet this Antonio, at the very first stage of torture, was conquered by the truth." However, even in this, his deepest humiliation, the man protested against his previous confession of infamy.

"He said of his own accord: 'See, my lords! yesterday, on the rack, I said that I had twice been at the *barilotto*; this is not true. I have a wife, young

and fair, and a comely daughter here in prison at Santo Spirito; and for that cause I would never have permitted [such a thing].’ Moreover, coming nearer and nearer, he said humbly: ‘My lords, pardon me!’”

No historian of the Inquisition has yet taken notice, so far as I know, of this poor wretch and his fellow-peasants, as portrayed in their persecutors’ official records; yet there is perhaps no document which throws more significant light on what might be done at any moment in the name of Christ’s religion.* What did Antonio’s protest avail? The orthodox multitude believed these things against heretics as they would have believed them against us if we had lived in those days.

CHAPTER IX

REAPING THE WHIRLWIND

HERE, then, was an engine so constructed that it might be turned effectually to any purpose; good purpose or bad purpose depended only upon the policy or the caprice of the man or the group who had this tribunal at command. Inevitably, therefore, it often became a political tool. It had a permanent effect on continental jurisprudence in the Middle Ages. Lay princes utilized this new spiritual explosive as they utilized the invention of gunpowder at a later

* Denifle and Ehrle, *Archiv*, etc., vol. iv., pp. 129 ff.

date. In 1200, secular justice was everywhere in a state of transition. Old Germanic justice had been mainly accusatorial and public; it was the accuser's task to make good his case against the defendant. The study of Roman imperial law at Bologna did a good deal to popularize inquisitorial procedure, under which it was the defendant's task to prove his innocence. These two contradictory elements, then, were fairly balanced in 1200; but the Inquisition turned the scale everywhere except in England and Scandinavia and parts of Northern Germany. In France and Italy and Spain, and in a great part of the Empire, ordinary secular procedure became predominantly inquisitorial, with the accompaniments of arbitrary arrest, secret trial, torture, and confiscation. This is why, in England, even the Tudors never reached within many degrees of the despotism which reigned and increased upon the continent during the later Middle Ages, and this is one cause of that contrast, which the historian Philippe de Commynes noted with such deep interest, between the comparatively civilized character of English civil wars, as compared with the brutal cruelties elsewhere.

For, when once a prince had armed himself with this new weapon, he could use it against any political enemy with equally fatal effect. It was the Inquisition which enabled Philip the Fair to suppress the Templars with a refinement of cruelty which far overshadows the worst injustices of Henry VIII. It was the Inquisition, again, which rendered Joan of Arc a helpless victim in the hands of her country's enemies.

To vary the metaphor slightly, when once the Church had introduced poison-gas in the thirteenth century, then, in the fourteenth, the politicians retaliated by gassing a whole body of papal militia (the Templars) and a saint in the century following. If there were no other counts against the Inquisition, those alone would suffice for its condemnation. It created a veritable scramble for heresy, and even a systematic manufacture of heresy, for, if your enemy was a heretic, then you were sure of your cause against him. When the Council of Pisa deposed two rival popes (1409), the assembled Fathers put this on the ground that both were heretics, since their action in rending the Seamless Robe amounted to a denial of that article of the Creed, "I believe in one holy Catholic and Apostolic Church." This, after all, was no worse stretch of the theory than the stretches to which popes themselves had long accustomed the world. The story is put with admirable brevity by Professor Alphonse, who in general is distinctly less unfavourable to the Inquisition than Acton or Lea. "The Colonna [family] had a personal animosity against the Gætani; therefore Boniface VIII., a Gætano, declared the Colonna to be heretics. Rienzi was accused of heresy for having questioned the temporal sovereignty of the Pope at Rome. The Venetians, who in 1309 opposed the annexation of Ferrara by Clement V. to the detriment of the house of Este, were proclaimed heretics and placed under the ban of Christendom. Savonarola was attacked [as a heretic] because he interfered with the policy of Alexander VI. at

Florence.”* Clement V. actually published a Bull condemning resistant Venetians not only to excommunication and total confiscation, but to slavery. The punishment of slavery was also decreed for political reasons, but under the same excuse of heresy, against the Florentines by Gregory XI. and Sixtus IV., against Bologna by Julius II., and against all English supporters of Henry VIII. by Paul III. These facts explain the cases of the Templars and of St. Joan. The French King coveted the Templars’ riches; therefore he persuaded the Church to fasten the tentacles of the Inquisition upon them. By dint of torture, they were made to confess to such abominations as had been alleged against the Albigensians, and such as, in most cases, scarcely any modern historian with a reputation to lose dares to maintain. No evidence could be got against them in England, where torture was not permitted by the law of the land. Therefore the Pope, by threats and bribes, compelled Edward II. to admit his inquisitors and to allow torture; then (perhaps by mere threats, which might well suffice), the required evidence was procured. Thus, for a few months, the Inquisition worked among us for the first and last time until Mary’s reign. So, again, with St. Joan. The English wanted her life; few Frenchmen were really willing to risk anything serious in her defence; on the other hand, some were ready to sell her or help her to the stake; therefore the matter could scarcely have ended otherwise than it actually did.

* *Encyc. Brit.*, 11th ed., vol. xiv., p. 593a.

CHAPTER X

HOW SHALL WE JUDGE?

How, then, are we to judge this strange episode of the Inquisition? For the only reason why we continually evoke these ghosts of the past is that they may teach us, for ourselves and for our children, what effects we may expect from certain acts or certain thoughts. We need not here linger over the pronouncement of a semi-official Roman journal: "If you looked closely, you would recognize in the spirit of those much abused institutions a sublime spectacle of social perfection"; nor, again, over a quite recent writer: "We have not a scrap of justification for supposing that our standard of values in such matters is any more final than were those of the Middle Ages."* But let us take our text from three learned Roman Catholics of our own day and one very generous Anglican, italicizing certain phrases which it will be well to discuss at a later stage.

Professor Vidal writes (p. 183): "Nowadays, we feel the greatest and most legitimate horror for proceedings so cruel [as this of torture]; and it enters into nobody's head to maintain that the epoch when they were customary was the golden age of justice. But as manners have changed, so words have changed

* *Civiltà Cattolica*, March, 1853 (an article deprecating the lapse of primitive laws against heretics). Maycock, p. 260.

their sense. Our ancestors would not understand the precautions of our [modern] judicial code, and our aversion from proceedings of information which dishonour their code in our eyes. Moreover, churchmen of the fourteenth century would be stupefied to hear men of the twentieth century speak of their society as barbarous and cruel because it permitted itself things *which everybody then thought just and humane*. We should do wrong to judge them more severely than the gravest and most tolerant of them judged themselves. To understand them, we must certainly place ourselves at their point of view. In the days when the Inquisition was in vigour, in the days when it was possible, and was even *recognized as necessary*, is it astonishing that torture should have been considered an excellent means of seeking the truth in the law-court? Both of these institutions [Inquisition and Torture] *appeared natural*. Men contented themselves with branding the abuses which slipped into the working of machinery that was so delicate and so easily set wrong. We [nowadays] make the mistake of confusing the abuse with the institution itself. Since we cannot do otherwise than criticize both of them, let us condemn the excesses which layfolk and churchfolk have committed in this way; but let us try to understand the spirit of institutions before we conclude, without qualification, that this spirit is, fortunately, superannuated."

De Cauzons writes (vol. ii., pp. xxi. ff.): "For minds thoughtful enough to understand of their own accord how the Church acts, and to give her a certain

amount of justice . . . there is no need to apologize for our tribunal. That which needs apologists is an act which goes against the general feeling of its own day, an act which arouses the opposition of sensible, reflective and virtuous men; apology is then necessary to show that the minority is right against public opinion and against the reason of many wise men. But when *everybody, for centuries*, is agreed that a thing has its *raison d'être*, why need we defend it?" He goes on to combat excessive judgments, which, in fact, are far less frequent in our own day, and adds: "Therefore, it seems to me, the Inquisition needs no apology, if, like prudent historians, we put ourselves in the place of men at that time. It was an evolution of religious and social discipline which, born of peculiar circumstances, was produced at *the necessary moment*, and *disappeared* later, little by little, when its organism became *useless* and dangerous." In France, "it disappeared just about at the time when the religious wars of Protestantism broke out in our land." Our third quotation shall be taken from a far more learned Catholic than either of those, and one who insisted upon the moral teaching of history with an emphasis which is often blamed by his fellow-historians. Lord Acton wrote: "The principle of the Inquisition is murderous"; and again: "[Liberalism] swept away that appalling edifice of intolerance, tyranny, cruelty which believers in Christ built up to perpetuate their belief. There is much to deduct from the praise of the Church in protecting marriage, abolishing slavery and human sacrifice, preventing

war, and helping the poor. No deduction can be made from her evil-doing towards unbelievers, heretics, savages, and witches. Here her responsibility is more undivided; her initiative and achievement more complete."* And lastly, Bishop Creighton, whom Acton generally thought too liberal in his allowances for the spirit of the age as an extenuating plea for individuals, was to some extent in agreement with him on this particular point. Dealing with the question: "Ought not some allowance to be made for intellectual error?" he answers: "It is a thought borne home to the mind of anyone who reflects upon the past, that the sphere of human *error* in matters of morality is smaller than is generally supposed, and the sphere of *sin* is greater. . . . We must not be overcome by the glamour of great names. . . . 'He was ignorant,' they say, 'ignorant of the amount of punishment which his act might bring upon himself, ignorant of the amount of suffering which it would entail on others. Had he known this he would have paused. . . .' This may be true. But it cannot be pleaded that he was ignorant that his act was wrong; that he would not have condemned it if it had been wrought upon himself. If he had thought he might have known; but he did not wish for knowledge lest it might restrain him" (p. 29).

* *Letters to Mary Gladstone*, p. 185; *Correspondence*, ed. Figgis and Laurence, p. 217. Compare equally strong expressions on pp. 141, 148, 186 of the former volume and on pp. 54-5 of the latter.

In the light of these four quotations we may profitably discuss the effects of the Inquisition, and attempt to apportion the responsibilities. For this is what historians commonly do whenever they deal with ages so early that their far-off disputes awaken no painful echoes among theological or political parties in our own day. It is recognized that, in the past, individuals behaved very much as we should have behaved in precisely similar circumstances; and, under this word *circumstances*, we include current beliefs and standing institutions. But the beliefs and the institutions have changed enormously from century to century, and thus it is perfectly natural to find proportional differences between the normal individual's behaviour in the thirteenth or in the twentieth. And, since we may not rashly assume that all change betokens progress, therefore we necessarily ask ourselves whether it is for good or for evil that an institution like the Inquisition no longer exists. To ignore the question of human responsibility would make all history meaningless. In the past as in the present, good and evil arose either from individuals or from institutions; and, if evil came seven centuries ago, this must have been through some fault either in the men or in Church or in State, or in all alike. We willingly exonerate the men, but this turns our criticism more directly upon their institutions. Nobody nowadays, in face of the judges who condemned Socrates, or the magistrates or the populace who persecuted the early Christians, dismisses them in one single sentence of complete exoneration: "Polytheism was the belief of their day; to

criticize them from our own modern monotheistic or atheistic point of view is a crude anachronism." For, in fact, men's minds were not so hopelessly enchained to polytheism as that argument would imply; it is notorious that a minority rose superior to the general prejudices, and really wanted to give the Christians a fair hearing. The famous letters of Pliny to Trajan will bear comparison with Erwin's to Bernard, and they show more desire, I think, to understand the Christians than St. Thomas ever showed for an understanding of the heretics. Therefore we must considerably discount some of the sentences which I have italicized in the preceding quotations. It is far from strictly true that everybody in the fourteenth century thought the Inquisition just and humane, or recognized it as necessary, or dismissed torture as a natural proceeding; or that the Inquisition failed because it had soon done its work so well that it was no longer necessary. The time of slackening activities, alluded to by De Cauzons, is just the time when Petrarch complains that infidelity was fashionable among great folk at Venice; and, a century later, it had even crept into the open and was rampant at the Roman Court. It is Petrarch's contemporary, the Inquisitor Eymeric, who tells us plainly the Inquisition was decaying for financial reasons, unconnected with real religion, except in so far as persecution was becoming more and more unpopular, while those who least dared to risk their lives by sympathizing openly with the heretics were often most disgusted, in secret, by the continuance of these cruelties. Vidal brings out the

unpopularity of the Inquisition, though that of Pamiers was directed by a bishop of exceptional piety and morals (pp. 93, 146, 150, 193, 243).

CHAPTER XI

ACTON AND AQUINAS

THIS, then, is why Lord Acton refused to admit some of the modern apologies for what he called (in language of epigrammatic brevity and violence), political or religious assassination. He urged that, in fact, there has been no such difference of opinion on the subject of manslaughter, from age to age, as would suffice to exonerate the manslayer entirely. He was convinced that the intellectual and ecclesiastical leaders, even in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, either did know better or might have known better. In further development of this thought, may we not justly criticize the man who framed that theory of punishment for heresy which, upon the assumptions of his own age, is logically unassailable, which was actively adopted for many centuries as the inexpugnable orthodox citadel of defence, and which has not only never been disavowed, but has been reasserted by semi-official teachers in Rome during this twentieth century?* The argument of St. Thomas Aquinas runs as follows: (1) All *baptized* Christians are, *ipso facto*,

* I give full evidence on these points in my *Death-Penalty for Heresy* (see Bibliography).

subjects of the Roman Catholic Church; (2) that Church is "a Perfect Society" in the medieval philosophical sense; (3) therefore she has full rights of coercion and punishment over all her subjects; (4) not only of spiritual punishment, such as excommunication, but also of corporal punishment; (5) not excluding the extreme penalty of death. (6) Heresy—*formal* as apart from mere *material* heresy—is a crime; (7) and therefore punishable in proportion to its sinfulness and to the damage it causes. (8) *Formal* heretics are all who, not being invincibly ignorant, refuse pertinaciously to accept the Roman Catholic faith when put before them. (9) It is not for the individual to judge the point at which this refusal becomes criminally pertinacious, nor for the State, nor for society in general: the sole judge here is the Church.

Now, this question which St. Thomas was arguing was one of the most urgent practical problems of his day, and one which already provided a great deal of experimental evidence fitted to throw corrective cross-lights upon mere theory. That most important point, of experience as a corrective of theory, must be borne steadily in mind when we judge the Inquisition. On the one hand, there is real truth in Bishop Creighton's reminder that practical experience has done more than philosophy or theology to teach tolerance: "It must be remembered that [the compatibility of a great diversity of opinions with social order] was a discovery to be made, a truth to be proved" (p. 9). But this sentence, like all epigrams,

focusses one side of the truth and neglects another; for we may fairly require of the highest philosophy and theology that they shall not wander astray on the most important questions in life, or continue astray until they are suddenly pulled up by some natural barrier. A philosophy which has been disproved by practical experience must be reckoned, to that extent, as a faulty philosophy. Nor were St. Thomas and his contemporaries, after all, so entirely without practical experience to guide their reflections. The *Summa Theologica* was being composed in about 1250. Nearly eighty years before this, Pope and Emperor, in concert, had begun the systematic burning of heretics. In 1204, again, there had been the Albigensian Crusade, with its wholesale massacres ending in a good deal of disillusionment for Innocent III. himself. St. Thomas knew that, in spite of all this bloodshed, hundreds or thousands of people were still being born and nurtured in heresy, quite apart from perverts of maturer age; and he knew that these were most numerous in the most civilized districts of Europe—Northern Italy, Southern France, and great trade-routes like the Rhineland. The Greeks again, as pertinacious schismatics, were now being treated by Rome as heretics; here, therefore, was the problem of the heretic-by-birth on a vast scale. The Friars, indeed, had raised the Church to a level at which she was far less open to attack than before. But, though those Mendicant Orders had often been servants to the Inquisition, some thoughtful people must then have seen what modern historians now treat as a commonplace, that

the more intelligent teaching and the self-denying lives of these friars had been even more efficacious, in every deeper sense, than the steady physical coercion of which they had been the instruments. Again, apart from this practical experience, St. Thomas must have known, almost as well as any modern philosopher, that the taking even of a single human life can be justified only in the last resort, and that anything like wholesale slaughter requires some far stronger justification. Yet his logic drove him, from his own premises, to the conclusion that it is part of a Christian's duty, in certain conjunctures which occurred very frequently, to burn his fellow Christians, not excepting those who had sucked in the condemned doctrines with their mother's milk. He was not able to make any final exception for such heretics born; any baptized Christian who differs in doctrine from the Church, and who, having had those doctrines clearly put before him, is still pertinacious in his refusal to conform, must be left at last to the extreme penalties of the law. In all these cases it is for the Church alone to define the breaking-point at which he must be treated no longer as a lamb astray, but as a scabby, infectious sheep. St. Thomas was a very great man; but "we must not be overcome by the glamour of great names." In philosophy, it is even more important that a man's premises should be true than that his diligence should be stupendous and his deductions logically impeccable; and it may be fairly asked whether Aquinas would not have been a far greater thinker if it had ever occurred to him to dis-

trust those fundamental assumptions from which logic had compelled him to draw a conclusion so anti-social. Peter, the weaver of Toulouse, and the old woman of Acre who (as Joinville tells us) wanted to get rid of Heaven and Hell in order that men might love God only for God's sake, must have represented a mass of folk, lost now in the long perspective of history, who more or less definitely repudiated the crude horrors of the orthodox eschatology and the iron doctrine of "no salvation outside the Church." There were many thinkers, even in the Universities, who claimed philosophic reasons for a similar scepticism. St. Thomas knew this very well; for he wrote a treatise against them in or about 1269, and complained that they taught in holes and corners; as though any man who valued his limbs and his life could teach free-thought at Paris without some sort of protective concealment! Nothing but false historical perspective can represent even this thirteenth century as an age in which no intellect, not the very strongest, could reasonably have been expected to rise above the theological assumptions of its environment.

Nor can we really accept the objection sometimes put forward, that the heresies were purely negative; that they offered no constructive foundation. The Greeks, whom the Inquisition would gladly have coerced, had a theology intellectually superior, many men would judge, to the Roman. The Waldensians, again, had a very definite and quite possible foundation; they held that the final authority in Christendom is the Bible. Marsilius of Padua, perhaps the ablest

of political philosophers in the Middle Ages, held the same; so did William of Ockham, one of the ablest of the Schoolmen; so did Wyclif, one of the hardest thinkers of his age, though it was somewhat degenerate. Upon this foundation of a free Bible, there would seem no reason why heresy should not have done successful constructive work, except for the unreadiness of the population in general to pass from their then religious and social organization to any other. But, however we may emphasize this unreadiness, we need not necessarily be driven to conclude that the heretics would have done more harm than good by their propaganda at that time; still less, that this prospective harm was so great as to justify the Inquisition. The question may fairly be debated; but the *onus probandi* must lie upon those who would defend the Inquisition.

CHAPTER XII

ALLEGED NECESSITIES

It is often asked: What would have become of European society if there had been no Inquisition? Let us not answer (for that would not be true, though it has sometimes been said) that there could have been nothing worse than the Inquisition itself. We may more fairly reply here, again, that the burden of proof lies on the questioner. Let him explain to us how it was that this society of the Middle Ages needed to organize, as its only barrier against reversion to primi-

tive barbarism, the most elaborate, widespread, and continuous legal barbarities recorded in all civilized history. Nothing that the Roman Emperors did to the Christians can compare with the Inquisition in systematic pertinacity and in universality of area. But, though this counter-question would to many minds seem a sufficient answer, let us try to go farther, and to suggest a constructive theory, under all the reservations which common sense will suggest when a speculative difficulty has been proposed which requires an equally speculative reply.

If lynch-law had been discouraged, and no special tribunal had been set up, and prosecution and punishment had been left to the discretion of bishops, princes, or magistrates, I do not believe that anything essentially worse would have happened than was seen in the fifteenth century with the Hussites, and in our own day with the Bolchevik. It may well be that, in the then state of society, the only alternative to the Inquisition was civil war, brief and bloody like the Albigenian Crusade, or long drawn out in mountain districts. A society claiming to be perfect in its organization, and ready to shed blood rather than to allow the removal of a single brick from its elaborate structure, cannot, in the nature of the case, last for many generations without bloodshed. But war, with all its horrors and its general wickedness, has often given a stimulus to thought and progress; even as, though no man would willingly catch typhoid fever, yet recovery from typhoid often leaves men in better health than they ever enjoyed before. Goethe re-

marked this, and many observers have noted it since. Few nations have ever so suffered in war as the Jews; yet, between two of their worst agonies, they gave a new religion to the world. In ancient Greece, in ancient and medieval Italy, the most brilliant artistic and literary periods followed often upon war. If, therefore, it were absolutely necessary for us to choose; if, as some would have it, the only possible alternatives in the thirteenth century were inquisition or war, it may still be doubted whether a violent crisis would have done so much harm to civilization as a slow tyranny of centuries. Without the Albigensian Crusade and the Inquisition, Southern France would probably have broken altogether, at least for a while, with the Roman Church; so also might Northern Italy have done, and the Rhineland. This revolution might have spread, again, from Church to State; and the heretics might have ended by deposing the very princes and magistrates who at first had favoured them. There would have been a conservative reaction throughout the orthodox lands, like the reaction in England against Lollardy and in Europe against Hussitism. The revolutionary areas would have been more or less isolated. It is conceivable that one or other of them might have constructed a stable government; but this is not probable, and we shall more safely assume the contrary; therefore let us say that, tired of anarchy, they would have submitted again to despots in State, and to the Roman Church. But the struggle would not have been altogether in vain. England did gain permanently from the abortive

revolution of 1642; Napoleon's despotism was far less oppressive than that of Louis XIV.; if Russia must fall back some day upon another despot, he can never act quite as the Czars had acted for generation after generation. In this our hypothetical revolution of 1200, the Bible would have been disseminated wholesale in the vulgar tongue; and the multitude would never have let it go again.* The world would have been shaken out of its fatal dream of static perfection; and men would have paid more heed to thinkers like Roger Bacon. For Bacon criticized his contemporaries, Aquinas included, from the standpoint which, in many ways, is that of our own day. The scholastic edifice, he said, in spite of the constructive ability which it displayed, and in spite of its imposing size and symmetry, rested upon insecure foundations; for it was built upon an Aristotle misunderstood and a Bible misunderstood; moreover, its builders were sadly unversed in Greek (the language not only of the greatest philosophers but also of the earliest and ablest

* An inquisitor like Étienne de Bourbon was compelled to confess that Bible knowledge formed one of the widest cleavages between Waldensian and Catholic. He wrote: "I have seen some lay folk who were so steeped in this doctrine that they could even repeat by heart a great part of the Evangelists, as Matthew or Luke, and especially all that is said therein of our Lord's teaching and sayings. . . . This I say on account of their diligence in evil and the negligence of the Catholics in good." *Anecdotes Historiques* (Soc. d' Hist. de France), pp. 299, 307, 308.

theologians), and in the mathematical and physical sciences, without which no philosophy can be complete. .

CHAPTER XIII

REGRESSION AND DECAY

THIS complaint refutes by anticipation another purely modern plea: "It was no part of the policy of the medieval Church to stifle inquiry and discussion, by those properly qualified, concerning the ultimate truths of existence" (Turberville, p. 75). For the Inquisition could not possibly have tolerated free discussion along the full lines of Bacon's programme, even though that had been strictly confined to University professors. The active study of Greek would have shown what all Greek scholars now admit, the spurious character of that verse of the Three Heavenly Witnesses (1 John, v. 7); yet nobody in the Middle Ages could safely have expunged it, and even in our own century a papal decree has forbidden its discussion. Greek, again, would have revealed Origen's insistence that no educated Christian of A.D. 250 imagined himself able to raise his thoughts to God by contemplating a graven image. Again, it would have revealed a balance of early Fathers against the Roman interpretation of "upon this Rock I will build my Church." When we examine the limits which the medieval Church, through its Inquisition, set to all speculation upon the most difficult, and therefore the most contentious and

important, of theological problems, we shall find that they almost deserve Plato's sarcasm: "You bid me define the number twelve, yet you will not let me say that it is twice six, or three times four, or six times two, or four times three." Those thinkers alone could avoid arriving occasionally at forbidden results, who started unquestioningly from the majority of current presuppositions; and these obedient, through the mere fact of their obedience, were driven to conclude that the burning of their fellows might rank among the highest of Christian duties.

To describe the Inquisition without clearly marking these things is, as Lord Acton said, to "omit the part of Hamlet by desire"; "to describe the Revolution without the guillotine." Yet let us strive to strike an equal balance, and not to do the men injustice even when we condemn their actions. On the one hand, we must not try to excuse things for which there is no real excuse; on the other, we must not indict a whole civilization, the civilization which produced the Gothic cathedrals and Dante. But neither Dante nor the cathedral builders worked in the inquisitor's spirit; Aquinas himself was dragged unwillingly into it; intolerance, after all, was only one of the moods of the thirteenth century. Does not the true solution lie here? Has not a society, like an individual, its moods? Therefore, may it not sometimes take courses which are difficult to justify even at the moment, and which are pregnant with future consequences for evil? The habit of political proscription and murder, once formed, went far to ruin Greek and Roman civiliza-

tion. The persecution of Christianity, natural enough from the point of view of Roman imperial statecraft, has since been recognized as a blunder. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, the penal laws against the Irish Catholics, the persecution of the Quakers, the guillotine, are now universally repudiated. We know, when we search our own hearts, that we ourselves might well have been deceived into supporting or tolerating those things in their own day; but, now, at this distance of time, perceiving that they were mistaken even in their ostensible object, and therefore that they were blunders, we are no longer tempted to deny that they were also crimes. May we not, therefore, say the same now of this Inquisition? May we not recognize that its very theory was immoral, and that its results, as tested by experience, were rather unfavourable than favourable to true religion? For, brilliant as was that century of the first persecutors, the next six generations show a steady decline in just those qualities and achievements which we most admire in the age of Innocent III.

What else, after all, was to be expected? Many causes contributed to form the Inquisition; but, when once formed, it proved to be a tribunal with almost unexampled possibilities for evil, in an age far less sensitive than ours to bodily suffering or death. It was like a revolver in the Far West. The man behind it might often be peaceful enough, but the deadly tool was always there, ready to kill at any moment. We must not measure merely by the totals of actual slain; even more effectual was its constant influence over the

mass of men, who, naturally enough, had no desire to risk their lives. A small gang holds up a railway train without firing a single shot; the travellers know that the bullets are there, and they want to know no more. So also must the Inquisition be held responsible not only for the lives that it took, but for the progress which it arrested. The barrenness of medieval thought in certain important directions cannot easily be accounted for on any other theory. We must not merely count by the number of saints the Inquisition burned, even when we have reckoned Waldo and the Spiritual leaders as saints. The million little tyrannies which a Reign of Terror exercises over a million little people weigh far more heavily, when the ledger of history is accurately balanced, than one startling injustice done to one extraordinary person. The medieval thinker was, doubtless, free in some directions; but there were many avenues, most homely and familiar to his modern descendant, and most fruitful in results for civilization, which no contemporary of St. Joan could explore unless he was prepared to carry his life in his hand. Those who laugh and cry most sincerely with Mr. Shaw's Joan may yet feel that the spectacular martyrdom of a dozen such would have been less fatal to progress than that prosaic, unremitting, leaden, stupefying pressure upon the intellect—and, as many of us may feel, upon the soul itself—of all those unsainted millions for whom we may borrow Abraham Lincoln's phrase, and say that God has made so many of them because God loves that kind of person.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(Those marked with an asterisk in classes A and B are by Roman Catholic authors. Tanon is a French legist who confines himself to the legal side, and whose confession it is impossible to guess.)

A. *For readers without much leisure.*—(1) *E. Vacandard: *The Inquisition* (Longmans, 1908). (2) A. S. Turberville: *Medieval Heresy and the Inquisition* (Lockwood, 1920).

B. *For reference.*—(1) H. C. Lea: *A History of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages*. 3 vols. (Harpers, 1887). (2) *Th. de Cauzons: *Histoire de l'Inquisition en France*. 2 vols. (Bloud, 1909). (3) *Bernard Gui: *Manuel de l'Inquisiteur*. 2 vols. (Champion, 1926-1927). (4) *J. M. Vidal: *Le Tribunal d'Inquisition de Pamiers* (Toulouse. Privat, 1906). (5) [*?] L. Tanon: *Histoire des Tribunaux de l'Inquisition* (Larose and Forcel, 1893). (6) *Lord Acton: *Letters to Mary Gladstone* (George Allen, 1904) and *Correspondence*, vol. i. (Longmans, 1907; second volume never printed). (7) M. Creighton: *Persecution and Tolerance* (Longmans, 1895). (8) G. G. Coulton: *The Death Penalty for Heresy* (Simpkin Marshall and Co., 1924).

C. Out of date (except for certain documents which they print) are P. Limborch and J. A. Llorente. The following modern authors may suggest points of view, but must be read with caution: Comte Joseph de Maistre, Bishop Douais, Abbé L. A. Gaffre, H. Nickerson, A. L. Maycock.

BENN'S SIXPENNY LIBRARY

No.

(Continued)

50. EUROPE IN THE AGE OF NAPOLEON by R. B. Mowat.
51. ENGLISH LITERATURE by Professor C. H. Herford.
52. FRENCH LITERATURE by Maurice Baring.
53. ITALIAN LITERATURE by Professor E. G. Gardner.
54. SHAKESPEARE by G. B. Harrison.
55. GERMAN LITERATURE by Professor Gilbert Waterhouse.
56. RUSSIAN LITERATURE by Professor J. Lavrin.
57. INTRODUCTION TO ZOOLOGY by Professor Graham Kerr.
58. BUDDHISM by Kenneth Saunders.
59. MYTHS OF GREECE AND ROME by Jane Harrison.
60. A HISTORY OF LONDON by Gordon Home.
61. HISTORY OF WESTERN EUROPE, 1453-1789 by Sir C. G. Robertson.
62. CHURCH & STATE SINCE THE REFORMATION by Norman Sykes.
63. X-RAYS AND RADIUM by V. E. Pullin.
64. MODERN PROBLEMS IN BIOLOGY by William J. Dakin.
65. ENERGY by Sir Oliver Lodge.
66. THE STUDY OF BIRDS by E. M. Nicholson.
67. ARCHITECTURE by Christian Barman.
68. FUNGI: AN INTRODUCTION TO MYCOLOGY by Professor J. Ramsbottom.
69. A HISTORY OF MUSIC by Prof. P. C. Buck.
71. THE INQUISITION by G. G. Coulton.
72. THE INDIAN STATES AND RULING PRINCES by Sir Sidney Low.
87. THE ENGLISH NOVEL by J. B. Priestley.
101. MODERN SCIENTIFIC IDEAS by Sir Oliver Lodge.
102. THE AGE OF THE EARTH by Professor Arthur Holmes.
103. THE ATOM by Professor E. N. da C. Andrade.
104. CHEMISTRY by Percy E. Spielmann.
105. RELATIVITY by Professor James Rice.
106. THE EARTH, SUN AND MOON by Professor G. Forbes.
107. THE STARS by Professor G. Forbes.
109. EVOLUTION by Professor E. W. MacBride.
110. HEREDITY by F. A. E. Crew.
113. RACES OF MANKIND by Professor H. J. Fleure.
114. MAN IN THE MAKING by R. R. Marett.
115. INTRODUCTION TO PHYSICAL SCIENCE by Professor James Rice.
117. INTRODUCTION TO BIOLOGY by Professor W. J. Dakin.
118. INTRODUCTION TO BOTANY by Professor S. Mangham.
140. SIR ISAAC NEWTON by V. E. Pullin.
141. THE BODY by R. C. Macfie.
143. THE STRUCTURE OF MATTER by W. A. Caspari.
144. RELIGION AND SCIENCE by Charles Singer.
145. THE WEATHER by C. E. P. Brooks.
151. RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD by Rev. C. C. Martindale.
152. THE MIND AND ITS WORKINGS by C. E. M. Joad.
153. PSYCHO-ANALYSIS by Ernest Jones.
161. DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL IDEAS by F. J. C. Hearnshaw.
162. PLATO AND ARISTOTLE by Professor J. A. K. Thomson.
165. THE LIFE OF CHRIST by Rev. Dr. R. J. Campbell.
166. CATHOLICISM by Rev. M. C. D'Arcy.
167. PROTESTANTISM by Dean Inge.

BENN'S SIXPENNY LIBRARY

(Continued)

- No.
170. EDUCATIONAL THEORIES by Sir John Adams.
171. THE ENGLISH EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM by Cyril Norwood.
177. TRADE by Sir Ernest J. P. Benn.
179. MONEY by Hartley Withers.
227. THE THEORY OF MUSIC by Rev. Greville Cooke.
230. ENGLISH FURNITURE by Oliver Brackett.
231. THE ENGLISH DRAMA by H. F. Rubinstein.
251. NELSON by Sir George Aston.
252. OLIVER CROMWELL by Hilaire Belloc.
-

BENN BOOKS

MAN AND CIRCUMSTANCE. By T. S. FOSTER,
M.A. 21s. net.

The conception of history, education, and the struggle for existence put forward in this book will challenge public opinion.

POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REFORMATION. By Rev. R. H. MURRAY. 15s. net.

THE SCIENCE OF MORALS. By LEON ROTH. 4s. 6d. net.

A brilliant essay justifying the application of scientific method to the study of human conduct.

DISCOVERY. A Popular Journal of Knowledge.

Illustrated. 1s. net monthly.

Presents in everyday language a review of scientific literary discoveries, written by experts. The Trustees of *Discovery* are Sir J. J. Thomson, Sir F. G. Kenyon, Prof. A. C. Seward, Prof. R. S. Conway.

ERNEST BENN LIMITED

Bouverie House, Fleet Street



S0-BKK-095

